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DSR EVENT

Capacity market changes and opportunities for businesses



8 September 2016



Why a Capacity Market?

- GB market has historically delivered high levels of security of supply but the market and nature of the supply curve is changing
- Problem of "missing money" an energy-only market may be failing to send correct signals to encourage investment
- Capacity Market is an enduring market design to ensure sufficient investment in reliable capacity
- Capacity Market does not replace the market or market risks but operates alongside the energy market:
 - provides regular payments to capacity providers
 - capacity must be available and produce energy (or reduce demand) when the system is tight,
 - penalties apply for failure to deliver
- The Capacity Market is our principal tool for ensuring security of supply. Aims to deliver this at least cost to the consumer and avoid unintended consequences.





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Capacity Market annual cycle

& Industrial Strategy

Amount to auction	Eligibility and pre- qualification	Auction	Trading	Delivery	Payment
Enduring reliability standard established by Govt. System Operator develops scenarios of peak demand, and advises on the amount of capacity needed to meet the reliability standard.	Demand side response and storage eligible as well as generation. Mandatory for all licenced generators to go through pre- qualification process or submit an opt-out notification.	Central auction held to set the price for capacity and determine which providers are issued with capacity agreements.	Capacity providers may adjust their position in private markets.	Providers of capacity commit to be available when needed or face penalties in the delivery year. Capacity Market does not replace electricity market.	Costs of capacity shared between suppliers, in proportion to their share of peak demand.



DSR in the Capacity Market

Specific features for DSR in the main auctions

- A low de-minimis threshold of 2MW to encourage smaller providers and widen the DSR portfolio.
- Lower bid bonds for unproven DSR (50% of bid bond for new build CMUs)
- Participation in the auction as price makers.
- The choice of three metering options.
- The choice to participate in either the four year ahead or one year ahead auction.
- Transitional arrangements available for two years exclusively to DSR to help grow the sector ahead of the first T-1 auction.

The Transitional Arrangements (TA) auctions:

The Same	Different
 Annual cycle: summer-autumn pre-qual, autumn auction, delivery year Descending Auction format Stack revenues from balancing services New and existing resources permitted Penalties and over-delivery payments 	 Only turn down DSR CMU Lower de minimus (500kW) Lower bid bonds for unproven DSR (5% of main CM - £500/MW) Two products – load following and time banded One-year agreements for all resources Simulated stress events Testing regime No secondary trading

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The CM in numbers

Auction	Capacity secured / <i>targeted</i>	Clearing price	DSR performance
2014 T-4	49.3GW	£19.40/kw	 Over 1GW prequalified 600MW entered the auction 174MW won agreements
2015 T-4	46.3GW	£18/kw	 673MW prequalified and entered the auction 456.4MW won agreements
2015 TA	803MW	£27.50/kw	 Over 1 GW prequalified 621MW entered the auction 475MW won agreements
2016 T-4	52GW	?	?
2016 'early' T-1	53.8GW	?	?
2016 TA	300MW	?	?
2017 T-1	7.3GW	?	?



DSR schemes in GB

National Grid

- Short Term Operating Reserve (STOR)
- STOR Runway a new product to support smaller providers
- Firm Frequency Response
- FFR Bridging a new product to support smaller providers
- Frequency Control by Demand Management
- Fast Reserve
- Enhanced Frequency Response
- Demand turn up

Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) constraint management

• Providers are paid to help the DNO manage infrequent localised constraint on the network.

Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) schemes

• A number of DNOs are trialling DSR schemes funded by OFGEM.

Triad avoidance (TNUoS)

- Triad Avoidance Energy suppliers are charged for the costs of the Transmission system according to their share of demand at peak times in winter.
- They can reduce their share of these costs by contracting with DSR and embedded generation to reduce energy use or generate at peak times.
- The process of avoiding these high costs is called Triad avoidance.

(DUoS) Charge Avoidance

 Duos shifting involves avoiding energy consumption at certain times of day, every weekday, from April to October to avoid distribution network charging.

Static Time of Use Tariffs

 Suppliers incentivise customers to reduce demand at peak times by offering cheaper charges at non-peak times e.g. economy7

Recent and upcoming changes

CM Review (early 2016) concluded:

- CM fundamentally retains investor confidence as a mechanism
- But need to buy more capacity and earlier to provide greater resilience against increased capacity risks
- Tighten penalties for failing to honour agreements won
- Bring CM delivery/revenues forward via a new 'early' auction for delivery in 2017/18
- TA auction restricted to turn-down DSR only and threshold reduced to 500MW

Next steps

- Prequalification: 1 August 26 August
- Revise parameters post-prequalification October
- State Aid approval for the 'early' auction ?October
- Auctions held December 2016, January & March 2017
- Aggregators will be in the market for DSR capacity

In parallel

- BEIS consultation on confirming coal off the system by 2025 timing tbd
- Ofgem statement on review of embedded benefits July
- Defra consultation on small plant emissions autumn

Longer term

• 5-yearly review of the CM – reporting in 2019

Challenges for DSR

- Nearly 1GW of DSR capacity secured agreements in last year's auctions
- Stakeholders have called for changes to improve DSR participation:
 - DSR should be eligible for longer term agreements
 - Set a minimum procurement level for every T-1 auction
 - Reduce the level of bid bonds
 - Simplify the testing and metering provisions
 - Allow a form of DSR asset reallocation
 - Introduce time-banded products in the main auction
 - Split auctions / additional TAs
- Always open to suggestions want to ensure there are no unnecessary barriers to participation
- But any changes must not undermine key objectives and principles ensuring security of supply, minimising costs to consumers and technology neutrality
- Call for evidence on Smart to be published soon asks:

What changes to CM application/verification processes could reduce barriers to flexibility and what longer term evolutions within/alongside the CM might be needed to enable newer forms of flexibility (such as storage and DSR) to contribute in light of future smart system developments?

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Thank you